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FAMILY LAW: ADOPTED CHILD ENTITLED
TO INHERIT FROM HIS NATURAL FAMILY
AS A LINEAL DESCENDANT: ESTATE
OF ZOOK (CAL. 1965)
In 1955 the California Legislature amended California Probate
Code Section 257 to read:
An adopted child shall be deemed a descendant of one who has adopted
him, the same as a natural child, for all purposes of succession by, from
or through the adopting parent the same as a natural parent. An
adopted child does not succeed to the estate of a natural parent when
the relationship between them has been severed by adoption, nor does
such natural parent succeed to the estate of such adopted child, nor
does such adopted child succeed to the estate of a relative of the natural
parent, nor does any relative of the natural parent succeed to the
estate of an adopted child.

An appellate court subsequently interpreted Section 257 in
Estate of Dillehunt,' stating:
It seems clear .. .that by the amendment of the section it was the
intention of the Legislature to provide that the adopted child had rights
of inheritance in the estate of his adoptive parents only, [and that] he
be granted all of the rights of a natural child with reference thereto, but
that by the adoption, his rights of inheritance from or through his
natural parents were severed and terminated. There seems to be no
room for any other construction in the light of the express language
2
used.

This interpretation of Section 257 was recently approved in Estate
of Goulart,a wherein the court held that there was "a complete
severance of the former relationship of the adoptee with his natural,
or biological, relatives... (such as) to make them no longer 'kindred'
in the eyes of the law."4
Estate of Dillehunt and Estate of Goulart were cases involving
the application of the rules of intestate succession and adoption
to the particular testamentary problems, i.e. the problem of a pretermitted heir and the problem of an anti-lapse statute. In Estate
of Zook' the Supreme Court of California had before it the problem
of applying California Revenue and Taxation Code Section 13307
to bequests to grandchildren who had been adopted out of the testa1 175 Cal. App. 2d 464, 346 P.2d 245 (1959).

Id. at 467, 346 P.2d at 246-247.
3 222 Cal. App. 2d 808, 35 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1963).
4 Id. at 820, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
5 62 A.C. 511, 399 P.2d 53, 42 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1965).
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trix' natural family. The court held that Section 257 does not operate to broadly redefine the concept of lineal issue for inheritance
tax purposes, and an adopted child is entitled to inherit from his
natural family, not as a stranger, but as a "Class A" transferee. (A
"Class A" transferee is a transferee who is the husband, wife, lineal
ancestor or lineal issue of the decedent.)
A cursory glance at Estate of Zook creates the impression that
Section 257 has now been specifically defined and limited to problems
involving intestate succession, whether the problem is basically
testamentary or ab intestato in nature. An examination of the development of the law leading up to Section 257, and the 1955 Amendment, is therefore necessary to determine if Zook actually does stand
for such a proposition.
The earliest California statute which directly regulated inheritance and the adopted child was enacted in the legislative year 186970. The statute provided that:
A child, when adopted, takes the name of the person adopting, and
the two thenceforth shall bear towards each other the legal relation of
parent and child, and the minor shall enjoy all the legal rights and be

subject to all the duties appertaining to that relation; except, however,

that if the adopted child leaves descendants, ascendants, brothers or
sisters, the party adopting, nor his relatives, shall not inherit the estate

of the adopted child, nor any part thereof .... 6

In 1872 the inheritance clause of the 1869-70 Statute was excluded
when the Legislature adopted California Civil Code Section 228.
Even though the inheritance clause was excluded, Section 228 was
interpreted as completely severing the relationship between the
7
adopted child and his natural parents. In Estate of Jobson the
court held that:
...various rulings seem to establish the doctrine that the effect of an
adoption under our Civil Code is to establish the legal relation of parent

and child, with all the incidents and consequences of that relation, between the adopting parent and the adopted child. This necessarily
implies that the natural relationship between the child and its parents
8
by blood is superseded.

Estate of Jobson, in 1912, clarified the law pertaining to the
relationship between the adopted child and his natural parents. Four
years later In Re Darling9 clarified the status of the adopted child
with respect to collateral relations:
STAT.

OF CALIF.,

1869-70, c. 385, p. 531, § 6.

7 164 Cal. 312, 128 Pac. 938 (1912).

8 Id. at 316-317, 128 Pac. at 939. See, e.g., Estate of Pillsbury, 175 Cal. 454, 166
Pac. 11 (1917) ; Estate of Ballou, 181 Cal. 61, 183 Pac. 440 (1919).
9 173 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606 (1916).
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The adoption statutes of this state do not purport to affect the relationship of any person other than that of the parents by blood, the
adopting parents and the child. It is the person adopting the child
who, by the express terms of the Section, after adoption "shall sustain
towards each other the legal relation of parent and child and have all
the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relation." . . . The
adoption simply fixes the status of the child as to its former and
adopted parents. To its grandparents by blood it continues to be a
grandchild, and the child of its parents by blood. It does not acquire
new grandparents in the person of the father and mother of an adopting parent.' 0
Estate of Darling was followed until 1931 when it was codified in
Probate Code Section 257:
An adopted child succeeds to the estate of one who has adopted him,
the same as a natural child; and the person adopting succeeds to the
estate of an adopted child, the same as a natural parent. An adopted
child does not succeed to the estate of a natural parent when the relationship between them has been severed by the adoption, nor does
such natural parent succeed to the estate of such adopted child.
In maintaining the limited severance of the relationship of the

adopted child and his natural parents, the court in Estate of Esposito" construed the terms "brother or sister," as found in Probate
Code Section 225,12 holding that "so far as the right of inheritance
is concerned, the child does not acquire new brothers and sisters in
the persons of the natural children of the adoptive parents . . . nor
lose the brothers and sisters of its own blood."'"
In

1955 the Supreme Court followed Estate of Esposito in

Estate of Calhoun 4 wherein it held that "in no decision has the
court determined the status of an adopted child as a 'brother or
sister' [as to the children of the adoptive parents] within the meaning of Section 225 of the Probate Code."' 5 However, the court went
on to state:
When the original adoption statutes were enacted, adoptions were infrequent and most often occurred when the parents consented to the
adoption of their child by persons known to them, or as consequence
of the assumption of care and custody of an orphan by a blood
relative. Under present day conditions it may be the better social
policy to substitute the relationship of the adoptive family for that of

Id. at 225-226, 159 Pac. at 608.
11 57 Cal. App. 2d 859, 135 P.2d 167 (1943).
12 "If the decedent leaves neither issue nor spouse, the estate goes to his parents
in equal shares, . . . or if both are dead in equal shares to his brothers and sisters
and to the decendants of deceased brothers and sisters by right of representation."
13 57 Cal. App. 2d at 865-866, 135 P.2d at 171.
14 44 C.2d 378, 282 P.2d 880 (1955).
15 Id. at 386, 282 P.2d at 885.
10
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the blood relatives. With many children placed for adoption by agencies
licensed for that purpose, there has developed a demand for secrecy
as to the identity of the blood relatives, and in most cases, for all
practical purposes, an16adopted child is entirely cut off from his natural
family relationships.

This case, in part, was a factor contributing substantially to the
passage, in April 1955, of Assembly Bill 3734, which amended
Probate Code Section 257.
A liberal interpretation of Section 257, as amended, would seem
to sever all ties between the adopted child and his natural family.
The last two disjunctives of the section (". . . nor does such adopted

child succeed to the estate of a relative of the natural parent, nor
does any relative of the natural parent succeed to the estate of an
adopted child.") seem to make the severance manifestly clear if the
use of the term "relative"' 17 by the Legislature was intended to
encompass all the kindred of the natural parent. Accordingly, in
Estate of Dolan18 a natural sister of the adopted child was not entitled to succeed to any portion of an adopted child's estate, since
following his adoption she was no longer related to him for purposes
of succession.'"
Section 257 also precludes an adopted child from being a pre2
termitted heir with respect to his natural family. " Where the son
of a deceased child was adopted by another person before the death
of the natural grandparent, whose will made no mention of the son
or deceased father, the court held "the law at the time of the death
of the testator governs, [1957], and accordingly appellant is not an
heir at law and not a pretermitted heir."'"
In Estate of Goulart22 the court held that California Probate
Code Section 92 (the anti-lapse statute) could not prevent failure
of devises to natural brothers and sisters of an adopted testatrix
because under Section 257 the natural brothers and sisters of the
testatrix were no longer her kindred. In defining kindred the court
stated:
The word "kindred" is not defined in the Probate Code. Although no
amendment to section 92 has been made, it appears that the Legislature
16 Id. at 387, 282 P.2d at 886.

17 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951) defines relative as "a kinsman; a
person connected with another by blood or affinity."
18 169 Cal. App. 2d 628, 337 P.2d 498 (1959).
19 See, e.g., Estate of Serventi, 190 Cal. App. 2d 514, 12 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1961)
(which held the petitioner, an adopted child, would not succeed to any portion in
the estate of the brother of his predeceased father) ; Estate of Garey, 214 Cal. App.
2d 39, 29 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1963).
20 Estate of Dillehunt, 175 Cal. App. 2d 464, 346 P.2d 245 (1959).
21 Id. at 468, 346 P.2d at 248.
22 222 Cal. App. 2d 808, 35 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1963).
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intended to create new kindred for the adoptee. We believe that this
conclusion follows from (1) the new policy of the state in respect of
adoptions, as shown by the history of the 1955 amendment to section
257 of the Probate Code, (2) the trend of judicial decisions, and (3)
the logical consequence of construing the word "kindred" as applying
2
exclusively to the new, or adoptive familial relationship.
CONCLUSION

After examining the development of the law before and after
the 1955 amendment to Section 257, there seems to emerge in the
statutes and case law a certain consonance of thought, and application of a basic social objective. This objective seems to be the protection of the adopted child in those cases where the ties of a
family relationship have, for all practical purposes, been severed.
This protection is to be afforded by the complete severance of the
relationship of the adopted child to his natural family. The statutes,
codes and cases preceeding Estate of Zook dealt specifically with
situations where the adoptee and/or the adoptee's natural family
were not specifically proclaimed or recognized in the testamentary
disposition of the other. And, though a case may have had as a basic
issue a particular testamentary disposition, the issue of the adoptee
or the adoptee's natural family has arisen under questions involving
the application of the rules of intestate succession.
In Estate of Zook, there is the distinct difference of a bequest
recognizing the testatrix' grandchildren, notwithstanding their adoption out of the family. The court, in recognizing this distinguishing
feature, stated:
Usually, or often, an adoption situation involves the severance, in fact
as well as in law, of one set of parental bonds and the replacement
thereof by another. The law of intestate succession, in section 257,
recognizes this usual attitude. But in a situation where, as here, by
will, a testatrix has proclaimed her intention to observe the natural
bonds, the situation may well demand different treatment. This should
be particularly true where the textatrix was not a party to the adoption
and thus could not be deemed to have voluntarily or constructively
severed her natural family bonds with the child. By continuing to bear
toward such child the attitude of affection which generally accompanies
a specific bequest, the ties between the child and the testatrix cannot
be said to have been severed in fact as they have been in law. 24

Thus it appears that the court's narrow construction of Section 257
has resulted, for purposes of taxation, at least, in fulfilling both the
legal and social needs of the adopted child and his natural and
adopted families and relatives.
William Moore

23 Id. at 820, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
24 62 A.C. 511, 514-515, 399 P.2d 53, 56, 42 Cal. Rptr. 597, 600.

